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Is Value-added Tax a Moneymaking-Machine for Developing Economies? 
 Evidence from Ghana 
 





Value-added tax (VAT) became a tax of choice recommended by the Breton Wood Institutions 
to boost tax revenue shares in developing countries. However, after several decades of VAT 
implementation globally, empirical evidence on its revenue effects is still inconclusive. The key 
question in this paper is: has the adoption of value-added tax (VAT) really made Ghana’s tax 
revenue mobilisation better off? This paper employs both the Fully Modified OLS and 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approaches to test the moneymaking hypothesis for 
Ghana’s VAT.  On the whole, the study fails to uphold the view that the VAT is a money-
machine for Ghana. This implies that its adoption has not really brought about any dramatic 
improvement in aggregate tax shares. The study therefore recommends a reduction in the over 
concentration on VAT.  An appropriate balance of tax-mix is therefore recommended.  
 
 
JEL classification: H25, E62, O23, 
Keywords: value-added tax, fiscal policy, government revenue, development policy  
                                                             
† For correspondence, School of Economics, University of Cape Coast, Ghana,fandoh@ucc.edu.gh  
‡ Nehemiah E. Osoro,Dept. of Economics,University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, osoro@udsm.ac.tz 
§ Eliab Luvanda,Dept. of Economics,University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,luvanda@udsm.ac.tz 
 




Mobilising adequate revenue to finance national budgets and other development needs continues 
to remain a major challenge in most developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) countries. This situation is mostly attributed to low domestic revenue generation due 
particularly to poorly structured tax systems and weak tax administration among others (Stotsky 
et al. 1997). This situation, coupled with the high public expenditure demands has placed most 
SSA economies in fiscal distress.  
 
In the early 1980s, most countries in SSA embraced the structural adjustment programme (SAP) 
spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. An overarching 
goal of the SAP in SSA was to strengthen the tax system through the introduction of a broad 
based consumption tax (World Bank 1991). To the Bretton Woods development finance 
institutions, Value Added Tax (VAT) was the tax of choice to address the inefficiencies in the 
tax systems in order to boost government domestic revenue. It therefore became the common 
“fiscal pill” prescribed for almost all developing countries that approached the IMF and the 
World Bank for fiscal advice and assistance. Currently, all the 54 African countries (except only 
six) have introduced VAT (Crowe Horwarth International 2016). VAT is also implemented in 
more than 70 percent of developing countries (Ebeke & Ehrhart 2012).  
 
Bird & Gendron (2007) opine that VATs differ immensely amongst countries in terms of the 
extent of exemptions, zero-rating, threshold levels, number of differentiated rates, ease of 
accessing refunds, and nature and availability of simplified schemes. Indeed, after several 
decades of VAT implementation globally, empirical evidence on its revenue effects is still 
inconclusive. Some studies document positive revenue effects (thus, confirming that VAT is a 
money-making machine)(see for example Aaron (1981) for Europe ; Keen & Lockwood (2006; 
2010) for OECD countries;  Martinez-Vazquez & Bird (2010), Ebeke & Ehrhart (2012)  and 
Buettner, Hertz, & Nam (2006) for developing countries. However, others document no or even 
negative effects.  Riswold (2004), for example, rejects the claim of positive VAT revenue effects  
for both developed and developed countries,  Bird & Gendron (2006) find negative effect of 
VAT for Ukraine, Gemmell (1985) for Europe and Stockfisch (1985) for OECD countries. 
Gemmell (1985) specifically, notes that the rise in tax ratio tends to be more sluggish when VAT 
receipts (as proportion of total tax receipts) are relatively larger than the share of income tax 
receipts. It is further argued that VAT may interact negatively with other forms of tax 
instruments and as a result reduce overall tax revenue (Le, 2003). The situation is likely to be 
very severe in developing countries because of the general lack of the critical administrative 
capacity and structures to deal with the high demands of VAT administration. This empirical 
divergence re-echoes the long held notion that the revenue effect of VAT is an empirical issue.  
 
The Government of Ghana (GoG), upon the advice of the IMF, first adopted the VAT in 19954. 
VAT was introduced to replace the existing sale tax and the services tax, bringing them under 
one tax with a single positive rate instead of the multiple rates regime (which ranged between 
10% and 15 %). The VAT was to widen the scope of the tax net and broaden the tax base by 
roping in other economic activities that hitherto escaped the tax coverage. The move was to 
deepen the efficiency of the tax system to boost aggregate tax revenue shares and to address the 
                                                             
4 VAT was first introduced in 1995 but was withdrawn within three months and re-introduced in 1998.  
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persistent fiscal deficits bedeviling the economy (See Figure 1 for the trends in Ghana’s fiscal 
balance from 1971 – 2015) 
 
Figure 1: Ghana’s Fiscal Balance from 1971-2016 
 
 Source: Constructed by Author based on data compiled from various Bank of Ghana(BoG) annual 
reports and Kusi(1998) 
 
However, after almost two decades of VAT implementation in Ghana, its contribution to total tax 
revenue has consistently remained below 30 percent from the period 2001-2014 (Andoh, 2017). 
Moreover, tax-GDP ratio has persistently remained below 17 percent. This is lower compared 
with the average for the developing world, and even the average for Africa (Osei & Quartey, 
2005; World Bank, 2014; Bank of Ghana, 2014). Figure 2 reports the trends in Ghana’s tax share 
from 2001-2014.  
 
Figure 2: Tax-to-GDP Ratio (%) from 2001 - 2014 
 
Source: Author plotted graph with data from WDI (2015). 
 
This paper specifically seeks to examine three key questions: (i) How much effect does the 
adoption of VAT have on tax ratios? (ii) Does the adoption of VAT increases the buoyancy and 
stability of aggregate tax share? (iii) Does VAT interact negatively with other tax categories to 
reduce aggregate tax share? These questions, no doubt, are critical for the discourse on public 
development financing options and indeed have implications for fiscal behaviour. Moreover, 
they remain germane to the political economy debate surrounding VAT administration in Ghana. 
However, to the best of knowledge, no study has specifically paid critical attention to the issues.  
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1.2 The moneymaking-machine hypothesis 
The concept of the “money-making machine” hypothesis of VAT is due Keen and Lockwood 
(2006). According to the authors, the term consists of two sub-hypotheses: the “weak” and 
“strong” form hypotheses. The “weak” form hypothesis states that, other things being equal, 
governments or countries, which adopt a VAT, are able to raise more revenue than those without 
can do. The strong form of the money machine hypothesis, on the other hand, states that the use 
of the VAT in itself causes increased government size (government size defined as the size of tax 
revenue of GDP). The strong form of the hypothesis implies the weak form but the reverse does 
not hold.  
 
A number of theoretical arguments underline the VAT moneymaking machine hypothesis. Nellor 
(1987) provides a summary of these arguments. First, it is argued that VAT reduces compliance 
costs as well as the risk of evasion because there is a self-enforcing mechanism inherent in VAT 
administration that incentivises the producer to pay VAT.  At each stage of production, VAT is 
paid on the gross value added and credit is received for the VAT paid on inputs. It is therefore in 
the best interest of the producer to do proper bookkeeping on all transactions in order to receive 
the full credit of VAT payments. Moreover, the multi-stage payment system of VAT 
administration reduces the risk of tax evasion than under a single-stage sales tax. This argument 
is re-echoed by Auerbach (1996) ; Altig, et al. (2001). Thus, this line of arguments suggests that 
since VAT lowers the cost of tax collection, it has the potential of increasing the tax ratio for a 
given outlay on administration.  
 
The second theoretical argument is that VAT broadens the tax base.  The introduction of VAT 
extends the tax base not only to items hitherto untaxed but also to more buoyant service sectors. 
This has a number of advantages including providing a leeway for the reduction in the marginal 
rates of other taxes such as income tax, thereby providing positive supply effects to firms’ 
expansion. Moreover, the incentive for tax evasion is minimised if the rates of other taxes are 
reduced. McLure (1983) notes that with a broad tax base, large amounts of tax revenue can be 
generated with relatively small increases in rates.  The implication of this proposition is that the 
tax ratio may increase initially because of extension of the tax base. However, subsequent 
increases will come on account of discretionary rate adjustments.  
 
Third, it is argued that, in principle, VAT has the characteristics that make it possible to reduce 
economic distortions. In other words, it is able to raise a given amount of revenue at a reduced or 
no welfare cost. VAT does not distort investment decisions, as producers do not face any direct 
burden of it when making purchasing decisions. Exemptions are granted or refund is made for 
VAT paid.  Another argument is that, a VAT designed to have a constant standard rate over time 
does not distort household saving and business investment choices (IMF ,1991 quoted in 
Riswold , 2004).  In addition, VAT is uniformly levied on final goods and services. As a result, it 
does not distort relative prices among consumption goods. Furthermore, as a consumption tax, 
VAT imposes a one-time tax on existing household wealth. Since the wealth is already 
accumulated, the tax on it functions like a lump-sum tax (Hubbard & Gentry, 1997). In both 
theory and empirics, lump-sum taxes are noted to have no distortionary effect (Gale & Harris 
2010). Finally, as a consumption tax, VAT is believed to minimize the disincentive to save and 
invest since it does not tax profits and investment.  
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2.0    Methodology and Data 
2.1  Time series properties  
The stationarity status of the data is first examined using the both the ADF and the Zivot-
Andrews unit root tests. Zivot-Andrews unit root test is employed to cater for the breaks in the 
series. The results of unit root test are presented in Appendix Table A1. In levels, the ADF test 
rejects the null of the existence of unit root in all the variables in levels. However, when the 
breaks in the variables are accounted for, the log of real GDP per capita and real GDP become 
stationary in levels (i.e. I(0)). Thus, the results from the Zivot-Andrews test shows that variables 
are integrated of different order. All the variables are however, found to be stationary at first 
difference (i.e. variables are I(1)) at 1 percent.   
 
With the variables integrated of different order, cointegration test is performed to ascertain the 
existence of long-run relationships. The appropriate lag order is first selected using the lag 
selection information criteria.  The results are presented in Appendix Table A2.  The results 
show that almost all the information criteria suggest a maximum lag order of 1. Thus lag order 1 
is used in performing the cointegration test. The Johansen cointegration approach is then used to 
estimate the cointegrating relationships among the variables.  The results are presented in 
Appendix Table A3. The result suggests at least one cointegration relationship among the 
variables.   
 
2.2  Model specification and empirical strategy 
In all, three broad groups of estimations are made in this study. The first group of estimations 
examines the weak form of the moneymaking hypothesis. First, a VAT dummy is introduced into 
a standard tax effort model to capture the effect of presence of VAT on aggregate tax shares. 
Following Keen & Lockwood (2006) and Keen & Lockwood (2010), the model is specified as:  
 
       (1)  
 
Where,   is the total tax revenue as percentage of GDP while    is the VAT dummy, 
taking the value 1 if VAT was in existence in a particular period and zero otherwise. The term  
is a random disturbance term, assumed to be independently and identically distributed.    
 
The variable  is a vector of control explanatory variables.  These controls include, GDP per 
capita, trade openness, and size of informal economy. It is well documented that the higher the 
level of development of a country, the better the quality and effectiveness of the existing 
institutions, including tax revenue collection institutions. In the literature, GDP per capita which 
is found to correlate with the level of economic development is used as a proxy for tax 
administration capacity (Adam, Bevan, & Chambas, 2001; Khattry & Rao, 2002) (Keen & 
Lockwood 2010). The coefficient is therefore expected to have a positive sign. The structural 
composition of an economy is also critical in determining the performance of its tax system. An 
economy that is dominated by informal activities or agricultural led growth is less likely to yeild 
low tax revenue shares due to the difficulty in taxing those sectors. Piggott & Whalley (2001) 
and Emran & Stiglitz (2005) show that VAT is undermined in the presence of large informal 
sector. Share of agriculture in GDP is used to capture for size of the informal economy.  
Furthermore, Agbeyegbe et al. (2004) show that greater proportion of taxes collected on goods 
TRt =at +dt 'VATt
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and services in sub-Saharan Africa come from imports. Therefore, trade liberalization policy in 
the form of tariffs reduction has the tendency to reduce the tax base because tariffs constitute an 
element of the tax base of taxes on goods and services. In view of the fact that VAT is levied on 
the base inclusive of tariffs, the tax revenue is likely to be reduced with the adoption of VAT. In 
this study, trade openness is used to capture the effect of trade liberalization.  
 
Several variants of the baseline equation (1) are estimated by including controls as well as VAT 
interaction terms. Interactions of VAT dummy with the various controls are included one after 
the other to explore how they interact with VAT to affect tax ratios. Similar estimations are 
carried out for models that include interactions between VAT and other tax components. The 
importance of the inclusion of these interactions is to offer deeper insight into the channels 
through which VAT affects tax ratios. 
 
Keen & Lockwood (2006) and Keen & Lockwood (2010) (henceforth denoted as K&L)  estimate 
equation (1)  severally using OLS and GMM after  successive addition of controls. This line of 
action [of adding controls] is pursued in this chapter. However, given that variables used in this 
paper are integrated of different order but have cointegrated relationships, in this study, equation 
(1) is estimated using in a cointegrating regression framework that allows for different 
estimators. Following Dudine & Jalles ( 2017), the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares 
(FMOLS) technique ( by Phillips & Hansen, 1990) is employed to estimate the long-run 
parameters of equation (1) while allowing for linear trend.  
 
FMOLS is preferred over OLS because, in the presence of cross-correlation between the 
cointegration equation error and the regressor innovations, the asymptotic distribution of the 
OLS estimators is generally non-Gaussian, asymptotically biased, asymmetric, and contains non-
scalar nuisance parameters ( Wang & Wu, 2012). This renders the conventional testing 
procedures invalid. The FMOLS therefore employs a semi-parametric correction to eliminate the 
problems stated above.  Moreover, its estimators are asymptotically unbiased, possess fully 
efficient normal asymptotic properties, and allows for standard Wald tests making use of 
asymptotic chi-squared statistical inference.  
 
The second estimation under the first group tests the effect of the adoption of VAT on the 
buoyancy and stability of the tax system. Two approaches are used. The first approach introduces 
a VAT dummy into a standard tax buoyancy function.  In the second approach, the same 
question is asked differently: what is the growth (buoyancy) of aggregate tax revenue in the 
absence of VAT compared with that in the presence of VAT? Thus, instead of putting dummy 
like the first approach, the tax buoyancy is estimated after subtracting VAT revenues from 
aggregate tax revenues. The buoyancy is also calculated after each of the major tax revenues are 
subtracted from the aggregate tax revenues. This is intended to control for the possible impact of 
all major taxes other than the VAT 5. The results are then compared to see how buoyancy and 
stability of aggregate tax changes without each of the major tax categories.  
 
The specification and testing of both aspects of this proposition begins with the general 
econometric approach of estimating tax buoyancy, where Buoyancy is obtained by regressing the 
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log of dependent variable (aggregate tax revenue in this case) on the log of the tax base 
(Mansfield,1972; Osoro, 1993; Sobel & Holcombe, 1996; Wolswijk, 2009; Belinga et al., 2014 
and  Dudine & Jalles, 2017). The model is specified as:  
 
                     (2) 
 
Where,  is the log of tax revenue or tax share of tax type  at time ,  is the log of 
appropriate tax base at time  (GDP in this study). The parameters  and  are the constant 
and error term respectively while  is the buoyancy coefficient.  
 
The estimation of (2) takes a slightly different approach. Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
approach developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is employed. The ARDL model not only allows for 
a flexible dynamic relationship between tax revenue and GDP but also unlike other approaches, 
it has proven to provide consistent estimates even when the variables are integrated of different 
order, e.g. I(1) or I(0) (Pesaran and Shin 1998). The ARDL representation of equation (2) is 
specified as:  
     (3) 
 
Equation (3) shows that the growth in tax revenue share can be explained by the distributed lag 
of order  of log of its base (GDP) and the distributed lag of order  of the log of the 
dependent variable itself (aggregate tax revenue share). The Akaike information criteria (AIC) is 
used to determine the appropriate lag length in each case. The inclusion of appropriate lag length 
adequately addresses any possible autocorrelation and endogeneity problems. Since the focus of 
the study is to examine whether the buoyancy changes in the presence of VAT, equation (3) is 
modified to capture the presence of VAT. The modified model is thus specified as:  
 
     (4)  
 
Where,  is the VAT dummy, taking the value 1 if VAT was in existence and zero 
otherwise. Subtracting the lagged dependent variable from both sides of equation (4) gives the 
Error Correction Model (ECM) as:  
 
        (5) 
 
Where the first expression on the right-hand side of equation (5) shows the long-run relationship 
between tax revenue shares and the tax base.  The parameter  denotes the long-run 
buoyancy coefficient,  is the short-run buoyancy denoting the immediate effect of GDP on tax 
shares while  is the speed of adjustment, which measures how fast the buoyancy, converges to 
its long-run equilibrium.  
lnTRit =ait + bit lnYit +eit
lnTRit i t lnY
t a e
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Long-run tax buoyancy coefficient may differ from that of short-run. While the short-run 
buoyancy measures the stabilization function of fiscal policy, long-run buoyancy is important for 
the impact of economic growth on long-term fiscal sustainability.  If short-run buoyancy exceeds 
one (i.e. ), it suggests that the tax system is a good automatic stabilizer. If it is less than one 
( ), it means that tax revenue is more stable than GDP and therefore fails to be a good 
automatic stabilizer. On the other hand, if the long-run buoyancy is greater than one (i.e. ), 
it implies that higher economic growth will improve the fiscal balance through the revenue side 
of the budget and vice versa (Belinga et al., 2014).  If  is positive and significant, it means that 
VAT has positive effect on tax shares and vice versa. Four variants of equations (4) and (5) are 
first estimated. In order to examine the stability of tax revenue, equation (4) is modified to have 
the standard deviation of the tax share as the dependent variable. Using standard deviation as a 
measure of instability is well documented and supported in the literature. However, given that 
the aggregate tax share is not stationary in levels, the standard deviation is computed after the 
first difference is taken (Ebeke and Ehrhart 2012;  Bleaney, Gemmel, and Greenaway 1995). 
 
The third set of estimations focuses on the strong form of the moneymaking machine hypothesis 
has an element of causality. The key statistical question here is: Does VAT revenue Granger–
cause total/aggregate tax revenue? To answer this question, the Granger-causality test, a well-
known approach to test for causality between two economic variables, is adopted. Following 
Keen & Lockwood (2006), a two-variable unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) involving 
total tax revenue and VAT revenue is run.  The pre-estimation lag selection-order criteria test 
(see appendix Table A4 ) shows that the HQIC and the SBIC criteria prescribe appropriate lag 
order to be one (1). However, the LR, FPE and the AIC prescribe lag order of four (4). Since 
estimations may be influenced the lag order, the VAR estimations and the Granger-causality tests 
are carried out for both lag orders (i.e. lags 1 and 4).  The unrestricted VAR equations are 
specified in equations (6) and (7).  
 
   (6) 
   (7) 
 
where,  and  are the aggregate tax revenue and VAT revenues at time t respectively( 
both relative to GDP);   and  are the lagged values of aggregate tax revenue share  
and VAT  share respectively , with .  
 
2.3 Data 
 Both annual and quarterly series are used for different parts of the analysis.  The annual series 
covering the period 1960 to 2015 are on aggregate tax ratios, trade openness, GDP per capita and 
agriculture share of GDP (Agric-GDP share). This set of data is used to estimate the revenue 
effects of VAT, the VAR and Granger-causality test. The data is readily obtainable from the 
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) from World Bank database but is complemented 
and validated with data provided by the national budget statements, Central Bank annual reports 
and Ghana Statistical Service bulletins and annual reports. The second set of data is a quarterly 
series on real GDP, real total consumption, household consumption and revenues from aggregate 





TRt =a0 +s1TRt- j + b1VRt- j +mt
VRt =d0 +g1VRt- j +q1TRt- j +v t
TRt VRt
TRt- j VRt- j
j =1, 4
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of VAT and other tax categories on the buoyancy of aggregate tax and it is obtained from 
databases of Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Central 
Bank’s reports.   
 
3.0 Results and Discussions 
3.1 Weak form of moneymaking machine hypothesis: effect of VAT on tax ratios 
As explained earlier, the weak form of the money machine hypothesis implies that the adoption 
of VAT increases aggregate tax shares. The results from the FMOLS are presented in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 
Effect of VAT Adoption on Tax Ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)          (5) 
VARIABLES Static Model Dynamic 





      Model 5 
      (FMOLS) 
      
Trade openness 0.138*** 0.0881*** 0.0655*** 0.0985***        0.0686*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.00898) (0.00984)        (0.0101) 
Log per capita GDP  1.933*** 1.350** 2.721*** 0.489        1.604*** 
 (0.569) (0.548) (0.461) (0.556)         (0.508) 
Agric-GDP share -0.0906*** -0.0581*** -0.102*** -0.0258        -0.0582** 
 (0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0163) (0.0209)        (0.0245) 
VAT Dummy -3.155*** -2.442*** -10.94*** 2.252        -16.14*** 
 (0.499) (0.481) (1.511) (1.788)         (5.407) 
VAT*Openness    0.0993***   
   (0.0171)   
Lag Tax Ratio  0.513*** 0.553*** 0.499***         0.527*** 
  (0.0321) (0.0244) (0.0275)         (0.0337) 
Linear Trend -0.137*** -0.0849*** -0.109*** -0.0748***  
 (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0143) (0.0168)  
VAT*Agric     -0.127***  
    (0.0467)  
VAT*GDP             1.552** 
             (0.606) 
Constant 4.882 0.212 -4.681 3.178         16.20*** 
 (4.139) (3.970) (2.996) (3.508)         (3.336) 
Observations 55 54 54 54         53 
R-squared 0.440 0.522 0.575 0.514         0.507 
      
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Column 1 reports the results of the baseline model. It has VAT dummy but no lagged value of 
the dependent variable. The results show that trade openness and GDP per capita increase tax 
ratios. Specifically, one percentage point increase in trade openness relative to GDP increases tax 
ratio by 0.138 percentage point. The coefficient is significant at 1 percent. Similarly, 1 percent 
increase in GDP per capita is found to increase tax ratio by 1.933 percentage points. The 
coefficient of agriculture share of GDP, however, is significant but negatively signed. It suggests 
that tax a ratio is reduced by 0.0906 percentage point with a one-percentage increase in 
agriculture-GDP ratio. This reflects the fact that most agricultural activities are excluded from 
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VAT. These findings collaborate Keen & Lockwood (2006) and Keen & Lockwood (2010) and  
International Tax Dialogue (ITD), 2005). 
 
The coefficient of the VAT dummy variable (the variable of interest) is found to be significant at 
1 percent. However, contrary to expectation, it is negative. The coefficient of - 3.155 suggests 
that the adoption of VAT reduces tax ratios by about 3.2 percentage points relative to periods 
without VAT.  The negative sign of the coefficient of the VAT dummy is found in all the various 
specifications except in model 4 where it is interacted with the agriculture share of GDP. In this 
specification, the VAT dummy is positive but insignificant.  The negative sign of the VAT 
dummy seems to suggest that the weak form of money machine hypothesis does not hold in 
Ghana. The results is contrary to what is found by Keen & Lockwood (2006);  Keen & 
Lockwood (2010) and Martinez-Vazquez & Bird (2010)  
 
However, it supports Wawire (2000) for Kenya,  Desai & Hines Jr (2005) for a panel of 
countries and Bird & Gendron (2006) for Ukraine. Bird & Gendron (2006), for instance, explain 
that when the structure of VAT becomes plagued with privileges, reduced rates, and exemptions 
and zero-rating, they lead to erosion in the base, thereby depressing its revenue impact.  Gale & 
Harris (2010) give further credence to this explanation by arguing that the exemptions and zero-
rating is ineffective since middle-income and wealthy taxpayers consume these exempted and 
zero-rated products more than low-income households do. Moreover, the practice generates 
complexity thereby providing incentives for tax avoidance as consumers substitute between zero-
rated/exempt goods and fully taxable goods. Thus, the practice has the tendency to depress total 
tax revenues. There is some reason to believe that this can be the situation for Ghana as there is 
an existence of generous exemptions and zero-rating in the VAT structure.    
 
In model 3, trade openness is interacted with the VAT dummy. The sign of the coefficient is 
positive and significant at 1 percent. Specifically, the coefficient is 0.0993, suggesting that VAT 
interacts with trade openness to increase tax ratio. This positive sign plausibly reflects the fact 
that in Ghana import VAT contributes about twice as that of domestic VAT. Conventional 
wisdom holds that VAT has the tendency to work more effectively, the more open is the 
economy because more open economies ensures large import base on which VAT can easily be 
imposed.  
 
Model 4, includes an interaction of VAT dummy with agriculture-GDP ratio. In line with 
expectation, the coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that VAT interact with 
agriculture sector to reduce tax ratio. It is observed that, the inclusion of this interacted term 
renders the coefficient of the VAT dummy insignificant. Furthermore, in model 5, an interaction 
of VAT and GDP is included. The coefficient of the interacted term is positive  (1.552) and 
significant at 5 percent suggesting 1.55 percent points increase in tax ratios. This finding is in 
line with the general consensus in the literature. This observation may be rationalized on the 
basis of the fact that as the economy grows, there is an improved capacity in terms of 
technology, human capacity and logistics to implement the VAT.  
 
A striking observation is that, while the coefficients of the VAT-openness interaction and VAT-
GDP interaction are themselves positive, their inclusion in the model worsens the VAT dummy 
coefficient to -10.94 and -16.14 respectively.  While this indeed presents a complicated situation, 
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intuitively, it makes some economic sense. The presence of trade openness and increased GDP 
offers greater opportunity for greater VAT yield (i.e. positive coefficients of interaction terms) 
but at the same time offers greater incentive for greater VAT evasion and avoidance (negative 
VAT dummy). This may be the case when the growth of the economy is driven by agriculture 
and export. Exports do not attract VAT and it is difficult to tax agriculture sector. However, 
since they boost economic activity index, they have the tendency of boosting tax revenues 
through VAT. 
 
3.2  How does VAT interact with other tax components? 
The key question here is: Could there be an offsetting effect from other taxes? A common view 
is that in situation where the implementation of VAT also provides reinforcing information 
useful for the enforcement of other tax categories, VAT could interact positively with other tax 
to offset, to some extent, the depressive effect of VAT. This issue is explored by introducing 
VAT interaction with other tax categories in the tax effort model. The Fully Modified OLS 







































Interaction of VAT with Other Taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Trade openness 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.0954*** 0.119*** 0.104*** 
 (0.00921) (0.00903) (0.00813) (0.00936) (0.00889) 
per cap GDP (log) 0.611 0.770* 1.138** 1.064** -0.206 
 (0.450) (0.442) (0.483) (0.443) (0.471) 
Agric-GDP ratio 0.0101 0.00252 -0.144*** 0.0126 0.000743 
 (0.0178) (0.0173) (0.0204) (0.0179) (0.0172) 
VAT Dummy -4.316*** -4.402*** -2.805*** -5.732*** -7.483*** 
 (0.436) (0.440) (0.967) (0.525) (0.652) 
Lag tax ratio 0.458*** 0.465*** 0.451*** 0.449*** 0.463*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0260) (0.0243) (0.0266) (0.0261) 
VAT*PAYE 0.753***     
 (0.0827)     
Linear trend -0.0930*** -0.0931*** -0.160*** -0.104*** -0.0738*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0204) (0.0155) (0.0154) 
VAT*comp tax   0.657***    
  (0.0741)    
VAT*Excise tax   0.592   
   (1.229)   
VAT*trade tax    0.893***  
    (0.0979)  
VAT*sales tax     1.007*** 
     (0.106) 
Constant 1.055 0.550 6.950** -1.518 6.183* 
 (3.200) (3.162) (3.490) (3.200) (3.247) 
      
Observations 54 54 46 54 54 
R-squared 0.553 0.555 0.537 0.555 0.560 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Column (1) includes an interaction of VAT dummy with PAYE, column (2) includes VAT 
interaction with company tax, and in column (3), VAT interaction with excise tax is included. 
Columns (4) and (5) include VAT interaction with trade tax and sales tax respectively.  In all the 
models, trade openness, agriculture-GDP ratio, GDP per capita, and VAT dummy have the signs 
explained in the previous section.  
 
Contrary to the claim by the VAT critics, the results generally show that VAT interacts 
positively with all the major tax components. With the exception of excise taxes, the coefficients 
of all the interacted terms are significant at 1 percent. Specifically, the coefficient of VAT-PAYE 
interaction is 0.753 and is significant at 1 percent. This suggests an increase in tax ratio by 0.75 
points. The coefficient for VAT-company tax interaction is 0.657 and is significant at 1 percent. 
It is observed that the interaction with trade tax gives the highest coefficient (i.e. 0.893) and it is 
significant at 1 percent, while the company tax interaction gives the lowest coefficient (0.657). 
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While this suggests that the reduction in aggregate tax following the adoption of VAT is offset 
by these taxes, with PAYE giving the largest offset, it may also indicate that VAT in Ghana is 
more compatible with other taxes. This findings support Martinez-Vazquez & Bird (2010) that 
countries that have adopt VAT generally tend to have higher income tax yields and general sales 
collection.  
 
3.3 Does the adoption of VAT affect tax buoyancy and stability? 
Using equation (4) and (5), the long-run, short-run buoyancy and volatility for aggregate tax 
share are estimated. The ARDL results are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable for 
columns 1-3 is log of aggregate tax shares (defined as the total tax revenue divided by real GDP, 












































ARDL Results for Total Tax Shares Buoyancy and Volatility 
 
                     Buoyancy Tax volatility 
 
1 2 3 4 
Long-run  
LR Buoyancy   0.324*** 0.321*** 0.313*** -0.102** 
 
  (0.019) (0.061) (0.018) (0.034) 
VAT Dummy         -0.090 3.7 -0.731** 
  (0.404) (2.2) (0.256) GDP-VAT Interact    -0.391 -0.086** 
   (0.233) (0.031) ECM 
Short-run buoyancy 
SR buoyancy    0.396** 0.401** 0.481** -0.068** 
 
  (0.159) (0.141) (0.13) (0.024) 
     Speed of Adjust.   -0.171** -0.134** -0.187** -0.724*** 
 
  (0.068) (0.063) (0.07) (0.094) 
Dependent Variable 
(lagged)    -0.201 0.453** -0.342*** 0.389*** 
   (0.134) (0.145) (0.103) (0.102) VAT dummy               
 
-0.529** 
    
(0.175) 
GDP-VAT interact             0.062** 
    (0.021) Constant                -2.17**         (0.684) 
     Obs 50 45 47 49 
R-squared 0.221 0.367 0.453 0.761 
Root mean square 0.171 0.145 0.137 0.0116 
Log likelihood 19.57 26.22 31.69 153.17 
     Diagnostics     
PSS  Bounds Test  3.531* 5.647** 6.217** 17.163*** 
Breusch-Godfrey 0.3857 0.889 0.7352 0.6508 
d-watson 1.879 1.92 1.965 2.08 
ARCH LM 0.908 0.557 0.6241 0.1563 
Breusch-Pagan    0.1712 
Ramsey RESET - - - 0.1919 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Post-estimation diagnostic tests are also presented at the bottom of Table 5.  These include the 
Pesaran/Shin/Smith (2001) (PSS) ARDL Bounds Test for long-run relationship, Breusch-
Godfrey LM test for higher order autocorrelation, Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity, Durbin-Watson d-statistic test for first-order autocorrelation, Ramsey RESET 
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test for model specification, and LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH).   
 
Column (1) presents the model without VAT dummy. Both long-run and short-run coefficients 
are significant but less than unity, i.e. 0.324 and 0.396 respectively. The short-run coefficient 
suggests that a 1 percent increase in real GDP instantaneously increases aggregate tax share by 
about 0.4 percent. This shows that aggregate tax can function well as an automatic tax stabilizer. 
For the long-run, it increases aggregate tax share by 0.324 indicating that higher economic 
growth is very weak in improving the fiscal balance through the revenue side of the budget. This 
is not surprising, especially in Ghana, where for so long a time, growth has been mainly driven 
by agriculture sector, a sector which is difficult to tax.  
 
All the diagnostics results confirm the model is robust. The PSS bounds test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no long-run relationship at 10 percent, the Breusch-Godfrey p-value of 0.3857 is 
greater than 5 percent, thus failing to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, while 
ARCH LM test confirms that there is no ARCH effects.  Since column 1-3 are fitted without a 
constant (was insignificant so its omission improved the model), the Breusch-Pagan and Ramsey 
RESET test are not applicable.  
 
Column (2) reports the results when the VAT dummy is included. The results show that the 
coefficient of the VAT dummy is not significant. Moreover, the inclusion of the VAT in the 
model does not have any noticeable effect on the both the long-run (LR) and short-run (SR) 
buoyancy coefficients, the speed of adjustment and the level of significance (LS). For example, 
in column 1,  the coefficients of the LR, SR and speed of adjustment are 0.324 ( P-value <0.01), 
0.396 (P-value< 0.05) and -0.171 (P-value <0.05) respectively. In column 2, they are 0.321(P-
vaue < 0.01), 0.401(P<0.05) and 0.134(p<0.05) respectively. Thus, these coefficients do not 
change much in both models. Similar observation is made in column 3 when VAT is interacted 
with GDP. In all this set of findings generally suggest that the presence of VAT does not change 
the buoyancy of tax system, thus lending support to the findings from the earlier estimations.  
 
In column (4), the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the aggregate tax share. The 
story is somehow different. It is observed that both real GDP and the presence of VAT reduce 
the volatility (instability) of tax shares in both long and short-run. Particularly, while a one 
percent increase in real GDP reduces tax share instability by about 0.10 percent (significant at 5 
percent), in the long-run, it reduces it by 0.068 percent in the short-run. Similarly, the presence 
of VAT reduces the instability by about 0.73 percent (significant at 5 percent) in the long-run 
and 0.529 percent in the short-run.  
 
3.4 Does the absence of VAT hurt tax buoyancy that much? 
The key focus here is to examine and compare how both the LR and SR tax buoyancy coefficient 
change in the absence of VAT compared to the absence of each of the different major tax 
categories. The dependent variable therefore differs depending on the tax category whose 
absence is being examined.  For example, in order to examine the extent to which the absence of 
VAT affects the tax buoyancy, VAT revenue is subtracted from the aggregate tax revenues. 
Quarterly data from 2000 to 2015 is used for this set of estimations.  The results are presented in 
Table 4.   




 ARDL Results comparing absence of tax category on Tax buoyancy 
 














Long-run buoyancy 1.188*** 1.182*** 1.169*** 1.175*** 1.259*** 1.199*** 
 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.06) 
       Short-run 
buoyancy 0.281*** 0.290*** 0.297*** 0.287*** 0.298*** 0.321*** 
 
(0.1) (0.123) (0.1.3) (0.117) (0.112) (0.113) 
       
EC Term 
-
0.195*** -0.249*** -0.204*** -0.228*** -0.219*** -0.227*** 
 
(0.389) (0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.04) (0.042) 
Dynamic term 
Lag Tax revenue  -0.455*** -0.445*** -0.342*** -0.389*** -0.459*** -0.455*** 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.103) (0.102) (0.097) (0.097) 
       
Constant 
-
0.627*** -0.897*** -0.669*** -0.669*** -0.871*** -0.809*** 
  (0.201) (0.243) (0.202) (0.202) (0.245) (0.229) 
Obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.46 0.498 0.423 0.439 0.489 0.487 
Root mean square 0.081 0.099 0.083 0.094 0.09 0.09 
Log likelihood 68.58 56.16 66.5 59.26 66.53 61.71 
Diagnostics       bgodfrey 0.879 0.527 0.719 0.416 0.865 0.457 
d-watson 1.916 1.786 1.839 1.795 1.935 1.781 
Breusch-Pagan 0.4087 0.118 0.062 0.098 0.055 0.072 
Ramsey RESET 0.122 0.229 0.057 0.125 0.058 0.061 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The dependent variable in Column (1) is the log of tax revenue.  That of column (2) is total tax 
revenue less total VAT revenue, column (3) is total tax revenue minus company tax, column (4) 
is total tax revenue minus PAYE, column (5) is total tax revenue minus self employment tax and 
finally, column (6) is total tax revenue minus trade tax. Each model’s diagnostics are presented 
at the bottom of each column.  In column (1), the long-run buoyancy coefficient is approximately 
1.2 (significant at 1 %), the short-run is approximately 0.3 (significant at 1 %) and the EC term is 
approximately 19.5 percent  (significant at 1 %). In column 2, when total VAT revenue is 
subtracted from aggregate tax revenue, both the long-run (LR) and the short-run (SR) buoyancy 
coefficients still remain unchanged at approximately 1.2 (significant at 1 %) and 0.3 (significant 
at 1 %) respectively. The EC term however, increases to about 25 percent. Thus, the exclusion of 
VAT from the aggregate tax revenue does not have any considerable effect on the long and 
short-run tax buoyancy coefficients. This is in line with the observations made with the 
estimations involving VAT dummies.   




The lowest buoyancy coefficient is obtained when tax revenue is without company tax (i.e.1.16), 
while the highest buoyancy is obtained when total tax revenue is less self-employment tax 
(1.259). The tax buoyancy coefficients when PAYE, VAT and trade taxes are subtracted total tax 
revenues are 1.175, 1.182 and 1.199 respectively. This suggests that the absence of company tax 
hurts tax buoyancy more relative to the absence of VAT and the other tax categories. Thus, in 
terms of tax revenue growth, Ghana is not as worse off without VAT as with company taxes. 
This result thus, tends to demystify the notion of superiority of VAT relative to other taxes.  The 
long-run buoyancy coefficient of the VAT itself could possibly explain the lack of a 
commanding effect of VAT on buoyancy of total tax revenue. Andoh, Osoro, & Luvanda (2017) 
find the long-run buoyancy for Ghana’s VAT to be statistically equal to unity, suggesting a weak 
growth in relation to growth in VAT base.  
 
3.5 Does VAT Granger-cause tax revenue?   
It should be recalled that the key question under the strong form of the VAT money machine 
hypothesis is: Does VAT Granger-cause tax revenue?  In other words, is there any evidence that 
the increase in share of VAT receipt is a cause or consequence of increased government size 
(measured in terms of tax revenue share)? The results of the granger causality test are presented 


































 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tax-GDP VAT-GDP Tax-GDP VAT-GDP 
     
Tax-GDP share L1 0.716*** -0.0613 0.480 0.0605 
 (0.268) (0.0676) (0.327) (0.0861) 
Tax-GDP share L2   -0.0514 -0.0491 
   (0.342) (0.0901) 
Tax-GDP share L3   -0.366 -0.0593 
   (0.338) (0.0891) 
Tax-GDP share L4   0.180 -0.0258 
   (0.323) (0.0851) 
VAT-GDP share L1 0.896 0.292 0.134 0.327 
 (1.068) (0.269) (1.297) (0.341) 
VAT-GDP share L2   -0.533 -0.0160 
   (1.388) (0.365) 
VAT-GDP share L3   0.625 -0.0173 
   (1.351) (0.356) 
VAT-GDP share L4   0.297 0.195 
   (1.258) (0.331) 
Constant 0.358* 0.0959* 0.347 0.110* 
 (0.198) (0.0500) (0.224) (0.0590) 
Observations 58 58 55 55 
R-squared 0.272 0.271 0.4045 0.3539 
Prob > F 0.0002 0.0002 0.0014 0.0063 
No of lags 1 1 4 4 
 
Post estimation diagnostics 
    
Granger causality test (P>F) 0.4053 0.3689 0.9363 0.9023 
LM test (autocorrelation)   0.74098 0.74098 0.40929 0.40929 
Jacque-Bera test (P>Chi2)   0.66716 0.51751 0.23017 0.12285 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
L1, L2, L3 and L4 denote the lag orders 
 
All the models pass the post-estimation tests. Specifically, the Langrage Multiplier (LM) test for 
residual autocorrelation shows that, at all the lag orders, the p-values 0.74 (for columns 1 and 2) 
and 0.41 (columns 3 and 4) are greater than 0.05. This means that the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected, suggesting that, there is no evidence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals. Similarly, the Jacque-Bera test for residual normality shows that all the p-values for 
columns 1 to 4: 0.667, 0.518, 0.230 and 0.123 respectively are greater than 0.05 (or 5%). This 
means that the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals cannot be rejected, an indication 
that residuals are normally distributed.  In the last two columns (where there are four lags), joint 
significance of the lags is tested using an F–test.  
 
Columns (1) and (3) report the granger-causality test for government size at lag orders 1 and 4 
respectively. Thus, the dependent variable is government size (measured by aggregate tax 
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revenue shares). The p-values of the F-tests for joint granger-causality are 0.405 and 0.936 for 
columns (1) and (3) respectively and they both exceed 0.05 (i.e. 5 percent). Thus, the null 
hypothesis that lags of VAT do not granger cause tax revenue cannot be rejected suggesting that 
there is no evidence that VAT granger-causes tax revenue. Similarly, columns (2) and (4) report 
the results for VAT revenue at lag order 1 and 4 respectively. The results show that the p-values 
are greater than 0.05, indicating that government size does not granger-cause VAT revenue. 
Thus, on the whole, the results suggest that VAT is neither a cause nor a consequence of large 
government size (measured in terms of aggregate tax ratio) in Ghana. This finding is in line with 
that of Keen & Lockwood (2006). This may fundamentally be linked not only to the growth in 
the VAT revenue itself but also the extent to which the available VAT taxable capacity is 
harnessed into actual tax revenues. If tax buoyancy is high and at the same time there exists an 
enormous scope for further tax revenue, then it is possible for VAT to cause an increase in 
aggregate tax ratio. However, given the limited scope for further VAT expansion ( Andoh, 2017) 
coupled with the weak long-run buoyancy (Andoh et al., 2017), it is not surprising that Ghana’s 
VAT is not found to statistically cause increased aggregate tax ratio.  
 
4.0 Conclusion 
This study examines question of VAT moneymaking machine for Ghana. The key empirical 
questions examined are: (i) does the adoption of VAT increase total tax revenue ratio? (ii) Does 
the VAT interact negatively with other tax components? (iii) Does the adoption of VAT improve 
the buoyancy (growth) and stability of the tax system? (iv) does VAT granger-cause total tax 
revenues? The empirical analysis suggests that the adoption of VAT is not found to have any 
convincing positive effect aggregate tax ratio. 
  
Specifically, the VAT dummy is found to be negative in all the various specifications, except in 
the specification with agriculture share of GDP as a control variable. Moreover, the adoption of 
VAT model does not lead to any significant change in both the long-run and short-run buoyancy 
coefficients. This finding is reinforced by the buoyancy estimations where the absence of VAT 
does not appear to hurt tax buoyancy as much the absence of other taxes such as company tax 
does. Put together, the findings surprisingly fail to uphold the supposition that the VAT is a 
money-machine for Ghana. Furthermore the study does not find any evidence of causality 
between VAT revenue and total tax revenue. Finally, VAT interacts negatively with share of 
agriculture sector but positively with trade openness and per capita GDP. Similarly, the results 
show that VAT interacts positively with all the major tax components to increase tax ratios.  
 
It is puzzling to observe that although VAT’s effect on tax ratio is negative and its contribution 
to growth in aggregate tax ratio is weak, this is not lead to a downward trend of aggregate tax 
ratio. The picture that emerges is that the overall impact of VAT on aggregate tax ratios is 
substantially diluted, to a larger extent, by the stronger offsetting increase in aggregate revenue 
growth effect of other tax categories. Thus, the collective growth effect of the various tax 
components overweighs the depressing effect of VAT, thereby offsetting its negative revenue 
growth contribution.  
 
Undoubtedly, there could be other analyses that may yield other conclusions different from those 
made in paper. However, the key idea that emerges from this study is, the fact that VAT is, 
indeed, not confirmed as a moneymaking machine for Ghana, as suggested by the empirical 
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results, should not be a strong reason to relegate it to the background. As widely argued in the 
public finance literature, as long as consumption taxation is considered to be the way forward 
and is being encouraged to be made a key components of country’s fiscal system, there is 
justifiable reasons to maintain VAT in Ghana. Studies that examine tax reforms argue that 
switching to consumption taxation significantly minimises the disincentive to save and invest 
since profit and investment are not taxed (Yun, 1990; Auerbach, 1996). Moreover, the efficiency 
of income taxation is improved (Naito, 2004). Specifically to VAT, it is argued that it reinforces 
the principle of productive and allocative efficiency because it does not distort investment 
decisions since producers do not face any direct burden of VAT when making purchasing 
decisions. Moreover, it does not distort relative prices among consumption goods. In addition, 
VAT revenues tend to be more stable over the economic (Auerbach, 2010; Ebeke & Ehrhart, 
2012). Furthermore, VAT is said to be broad-based, reliable, has compliance advantages over the 
sales tax as it avoids the cascading problem mostly encountered in sale taxation.  
 
Therefore, in terms of policy advice, based on the findings, this paper argues that the way 
forward lies within the adoption of an appropriate balance of tax mix. This has the tendency of 
fortifying the aggregate tax system. As observed from the analyses, all the other tax components 
are equally important in maintaining aggregate tax revenue growth. Indeed, Ghana’s quest to 
finance its development mostly from funds mobilised domestically (rather than relying on 
foreign aid and bilateral loans) is likely to remain illusive if the over emphasis on VAT is not 
reduced. This is against the background that, unlike other taxes, Ghana’s VAT has a very 
checkered history, well entrenched within a political economy landscape. Frequent boycotts of 
opposition political party in parliament during deliberations on VAT amendments and the 
frequent public demonstrations that have followed upward adjustment in rates and threshold 
amply exemplify the level of public prejudices about VAT.  Within such a context, even if the 
best possible VAT regime is put in place, it is obvious that it will not be able to make the needed 
money to fill the fiscal gap in Ghana and developing economies as a whole.   
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Unit Root Results 
 





Difference   
Excise tax share -2.618   - -5.910***  
Company tax share+# -1.021 -2.699  -6.532***  
PAYE share+# 0.205 -1.229  -8.369***  
Import tax share+ 0.008 -3.259  -8.841***  
Aggregate Tax share -2.139 - -6.387***  
    
 
GDP (log)+# -0.623 -8.941***  -7.438 ***  
 Percapita GDP(log)+ -1.509 -5.580***  -7.026***  
Trade openness# -1.284 -3.093  -6.758***  
Agric-GDP ratio+# -1.519 -2.375  -7.672 ***  
*** (P<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1) 
+ Denotes test with trend; # denotes test with break    
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TABLE A2  
Cointegration Lag Selection- Order  
Sample: 1965-2015       No. of Obs = 51 
Lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -557.07       42238.9 22.002 22.061 22.154 
1 -377.21 359.71 16 0 68.58* 15.577* 15.867* 16.335* 
2 -369.64 15.14 16 0.514 96.63 15.908 16.429 17.271 
3 -357.96 23.37 16 0.104 118.06 16.077 16.829 18.047 
4 -346.69 22.54 16 0.127 150.91 16.262 17.246 18.838 
5 -333.05 27.27* 16 0.039 183.316 16.355 17.571 19.537 
 
                
 TABLE A3  
                   Johansen Test for Cointegration 
  
Maximum Rank Parms      LL 
    
Eigenvalue Trace stats 
Critical Value     
(5%) 
0 84 -187.85           . 35.372  29.68 
1 89 178.35 0.338  14.379* 15.41 
2 92 -170.66 0.284      0.9914  3.76 
3 93 -170.16 0.021     
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APPENDIX A4:  
Granger-causality Lag Selection-Order criteria 
Sample: 6-60         No. of Obs=55 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -95.271       0.109 3.464 3.493 3.537 
1 -75.225 36.09 4 0.000 0.066 2.953 3.038* 3.173* 
2 -73.676 3.0998 4 0.541 0.072 3.043 3.183 3.408 
3 -69.149 9.0531 4 0.060 0.071 3.024 3.221 3.534 
4 -62.881 12.537* 4 0.014 0.065* 2.941* 3.195 3.598 
Endogenous: Tax-GDP share and VAT-GDP share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
